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ABSTRACT: 
In recent decades, it has been definitely stablished the existence of a close relationship between the 
emotional phenomena and rational processes, but we still do not have a unified definition, or effective 
models to describe any of them well. To advance our understanding of the mechanisms governing the 
behavior of living beings we must integrate multiple theories, experiments and models from both fields. In 
this paper we propose a new theoretical framework that allows integrating and understanding, from a 
functional point of view, the emotion-cognition duality. Our reasoning, based on evolutionary principles, 
add to the definition and understanding of emotion, justifying its origin, explaining its mission and 
dynamics, and linking it to higher cognitive processes, mainly with attention, cognition, decision-making 
and consciousness. According to our theory, emotions are the mechanism for brain function optimization, 
besides being the contingency and stimuli prioritization system. As a result of this approach, we have 
developed a dynamic systems-level model capable of providing plausible explanations for some 
psychological and behavioral phenomena, and establish a new framework for scientific definition of some 
fundamental psychological terms. 
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Introduction 
The human brain is, by far, the most advanced and complex biological system we know. With one hundred 
billion neurons (1011), and hundreds of billions of synapses (1014) it is the physical substrate of our mind, 
and is in charge of making sense of everything that happens to us, either internally or externally. 
It is this structural and functional complexity which, today, still makes it extremely difficult for us to 
understand its design and dynamics. Our current technical limitations in the field of brain scan, do not yet 
allow us to observe all the processes that occur inside our alive mind with the necessary detail to achieve a 
full  understanding (Logothetis, 2008). Moreover, the inherent characteristics that define the growth and 
development of the brain (Bell & Hardingham, 2011; Inokuchi, 2011; Goda & Sabatini, 2011), based on 
synaptic plasticity induced by the individual's own life experiences as a modeler (Hebb, 1949), make each 
object of study unique, inevitably forcing us to focus on a more general model search that allows us to 
glimpse and understand human behavior from a statistical standpoint (Denk, Briggman, & Helmstaedter, 
2012). 
Numerous pieces of scientific research have addressed the different areas and capabilities that the nervous 
system exhibits, thus providing us with theories, experiments and observations that shed light on many 
facets of its operations, and generate a huge amount of information. Those all data sets still suffer from 
enormous knowledge gaps that must be completed in the coming years but, above all and most 
importantly, all these results are still unconnected and should be integrated into broader theoretical 
models, that would not only describe, but also explain and use them to make predictions (Gamez, 2012). 
These new theories should serve as a link between low-level observations (molecular, neuronal, etc ...) 
(DeFelipe, 2010) and their psychological and behavioral manifestations (Franks, 2005). 
Sometimes, to find new routes that let us move forward, we need to go back and get another perspective 
hitherto unexplored. The large number of different structures, networks and functional levels involved 
within the study of the human brain require us to take that step back, and try to find more general 
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principles that facilitate the integration between all those elements, and deduce important implications 
that, other way, would pass unnoticed. 
This article is divided into three complementary sections that describe the full reasoning leading to the 
proposed model, its functional structure and, finally, its dynamics. 
In the first section we use an evolutionary reasoning to find general principles that allow us to justify the 
features of the nervous system and the key variables that determine the quality of its operation. We then 
analyze the interdependence between all these variables, justifying the automaticity process and the 
existence of three different hierarchical levels of response. Then, we reason the existence of intrinsic 
resource constraints in the system and how these constraints give rise to the attentional mechanism. From 
this perspective, we define the concept and role of emotions and how they control and optimize the 
activation and operation of advanced cognitive mechanisms. Later on, we analyze the different types of 
cognitive responses and how they can operate over different functional elements of the model, thus 
leading to different behaviors and psychological phenomena. 
In the second section we introduce the functional structure of the model, which is deduced from the 
reasoning followed in the first section. 
In the third section we analyze the dynamic of the model and the interactions that occur between its 
different functional elements, as well as the implications that those dynamics have to explain the different 
psychological and behavioral phenomena we intend to address. 
  
5 
Secction 1: Evolution 
1.1. Physics and evolution 
Why does a living being relate to its environment? If we want to understand the functioning of the nervous 
system that lets living beings to adapt and respond to changes, we must begin by asking this question. 
Thus, the fundamental physical laws are the starting point for our evolutionary analysis; the second law of 
thermodynamics requires living beings to exchange energy and matter, at an appropriate rate, with their 
environment to maintain the structural order inherent to life, as we define it today (Prigogine, 1997; 
Kleidon, Lorenz, & Lorenz, 2005; Martyushev & Seleznev, 2006; Michaelian, 2009).  
Thus, the exchange and degrade of energy in the form of nutrients and heat, stands as a fundamental 
principle for life existence (Kooijman, 2010). From a practical standpoint for the maintenance of life, the 
goal of a living being should be trying to solve their needs at the lowest cost possible (MacArthur & Pianka, 
1966; Charnov, 1976). On this basis, the higher level evolutionary models (Eldredge & Gould, 1972; 
Sterelny, 2001; Gould, 2002; R. Dawkins, 2006) explore the need for every living organism to interact with 
its environment in order to carry out the life cycle, whether for feeding, breeding or protection (O’Neill, 
Johnson, & King, 1989).  
The evolutionary process has been selecting the different species (Darwin, 1859), each with specific 
adaptive systems, allowing them to detect environmental conditions under which they lived, as a first step 
to adapt (Barton, Briggs, Eisen, Goldstein, & Patel, 2007). But, it would be useless being able to detect 
environmental conditions if the living being couldn’t act on them, whether to change, remove or seize, 
adapting to them. 
Until recently, the "Modern Evolutionary Synthesis", primarily based on genetics and statistical mechanisms 
of mutation, transference and selection of genes, was the foundation on which the evolution studies were 
based (Richard Dawkins, 2009; Hurst, 2009) but it is a fact that, at present, there are many approaches that 
question the uniqueness of this central "dogma" of molecular biology (Shapiro, 2002a; John S. Mattick, 
2009; Danchin et al., 2011). In this sense, one of the most recent and impacting epigenetic experiments has 
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been recently developed to study the relationship between odor experience and its influence in offspring’s 
innate behaviors (Dias & Ressler, 2014). Today, mechanisms such as epigenetics (Shapiro, 2002b, 2005; 
Holliday, 2006; Jablonka & Raz, 2009; Zhang & Meaney, 2010; Maher, 2012; Fischer, 2014; Burggren & 
Crews, 2014; González-Pardo & others, 2013; Mendizabal, Keller, Zeng, & Yi, 2014) and evolutionary 
ecology (Fussmann, Loreau, & Abrams, 2007; Schoener, 2011) are allowing us to explain how changes 
motivated by the interaction of living beings with their environment, influence the selective and dynamic 
activation of genes (J. N. Thompson, 1998; Hairston Jr, Ellner, Geber, Yoshida, & Fox, 2005; S. P. Carroll, 
Hendry, Reznick, & Fox, 2007; Free & Barton, 2007), which in turn give place to different behaviors. These 
new approaches also provide us with new tools for understanding evolutionary situations hitherto 
unexplained as the "stasis" (J. Smith, 1983; Estes & Arnold, 2007), variations in the molecular clock (Kumar, 
2005; Takahata, 2007), the "C-Value Enigma" (J.S. Mattick, 2009; Fedoroff, 2012) or the Cambrian Explosion 
(Marshall, 2006).    
Far from being a complication, this change of paradigm on the mechanisms, networks and dynamical 
systems that underlie the processes of development and evolution of living beings opens the door for trying 
to address their knowledge in a more fundamental and inclusive way (Barabási & Oltvai, 2004; Eugene V 
Koonin & Wolf, 2006; E.V. Koonin & others, 2007). From these discoveries, we can approach the study of 
the development and conservation of different adaptive systems, structures and dynamics, in accordance 
with general principles that will serve as the basis for our reasoning. 
1.2. Evolutionary principles 
In order to find those principles on which we will found our modeling, we need to analyze what the 
different adaptive systems have in common among the different species that they currently own or have 
owned in the past (Butler & Hodos, 1996; Striedter, 2005; Abzhanov et al., 2008). To do that, we must 
consider the fact that, whenever a new species appears, all inherited systems and tactics have to face new 
conditions, environments, constrains and requirements for survival and reproduction that will probe the 
limits of its operating range (Badyaev, 2005). From a Darwinian point of view, we can say that each species 
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within their habitats are a new "experiment" that fronts all its functional elements to the filter of natural 
selection (Elith & Leathwick, 2009).  
If we take into account that 99% of species that have existed since the origin of life became extinct, we can 
postulate that the greater the number of species and the longer they retain a certain adaptive system, the 
more necessary, evolved and versatile this system should be. This reasoning allows us to articulate three 
fundamental and hierarchical principles on which we will base our reasoning. 
Necessity Principle 
To be able to adapt to certain conditions, be they environmental, ecological, sexual or otherwise, a living 
organism needs a system or a set of systems capable to detect those conditions and evaluate them, identify 
or develop one or several appropriate responses to address them, choose the better available and, above 
all and most important, implement such a response, acting on the stimulus either to use, avoid or modify it. 
If the individual does not have such systems, or the ability to adapt the existing ones, also called 
exaptations (Gould & Vrba, 1982), and the stimulus does not spontaneously disappear, it won’t be able to 
resolve the challenge. This fact is even more evident if we refer to a change affecting a system shared 
among a large number of very different species, as it will be exposed to very different selection conditions 
(Boffelli, Nobrega, & Rubin, 2004; Hurst, 2009). We call this principle the “Necessity Principle”.  
Efficacy Principle 
We can assume that, over evolutionary time periods, the environmental conditions to which species are 
exposed within an ecological niche can change dramatically, thus testing the responsiveness of different 
adaptive systems. If effective, that is, if they successfully resolve the situation for which they were selected, 
the individual survives, reproduces and the system is conserved. If they are not or cease to be effective, 
individuals perish and disappear. We call this conditioning “Efficacy Principle”. An example of the 
application of this principle may be the extinction of the large dinosaurs. Having existed for over 150 million 
years, all their adaptive systems failed (ceased to be effective), when a series of dramatic global changes 
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converged in a short period of time. Instead birds, the living descendants of dinosaurs, and mammals 
survived. 
Efficiency Principle 
We must consider that not only the effectiveness defines success in survival. As we have already seen, 
energy is the key component to maintain the structural order of a living being (E. D. Schneider & Sagan, 
2005). All adaptive systems have an implicit energy cost and thus, the body has to permanently devote a 
variable amount of resources to maintain it (McEwen & Wingfield, 2003). Along the broad evolutionary 
periods, all the resources necessary to maintain different adaptive systems have not always been available, 
so that nature will have preserved only the most efficient ones, that is, those that while maintaining their 
resolving ability, are also able to do so with as few resources as possible (J. M. Smith, 1978; Parker & Smith, 
1990; Sousa, Domingos, & Kooijman, 2008; Kooijman, 2010). We call to this fact the “Efficiency Principle” 
and we can also observe it at different scales. The importance of this principle can be seen in the fact that 
the human brain is able to do all the things we do just with the power of a light bulb of 25 W (Kandel, 1999) 
The fact that these principles are hierarchically related makes sense of some biological “inefficiencies” that, 
if taken isolation, some species can show (Wedel, 2012). Hereinafter we will apply these three hierarchical 
evolutionary principles to different levels and scales of the nervous system, both in the study of its 
functional structure, and the dynamics of its operation, thus facilitating the identification of the critical 
variables that define its quality. 
1.3. Nervous system: critical variables and optimization strategies 
If we now focus on the nervous system, we can easily infer that responses are the last link in the processing 
chain to face a challenging stimulus. Thus, responses integrate and summarize all the processed 
information, from lower sensory levels to decision-making and behavior. The success or failure of the 
nervous system’s adaptive capacity depends, ultimately, on the quality of the responses it is capable to 
generate (Llinás & Roy, 2009), and the quality of the execution of those responses. Thus, we will try to 
identify which specific variables are to be adjusted and balanced to maximize the quality of both. 
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The first reflection we do is about the "necessity" of nervous system activation, understanding by “need” 
the generation of a response only in those cases where it is really necessary. If the responses were 
generated randomly or continuously, without mediating a need, maybe some would be effective, few, but 
what is certain is that it would be inefficient. In order to assess the concept of necessity, the nervous 
system must have an indicator to define when to execute a response. The variable that indicates whether 
or not to generate a response is called “Activation Threshold”, and it is defined as the minimum difference 
between the stimulus received and an internal reference that produce neural circuitry activation 
(Platkiewicz & Brette, 2010). This variable is permanently and dynamically readjusted (Lu, Roach, Song, & 
Berger, 2012). A too low threshold is inefficient, generating unnecessary responses, at great cost in time, 
resources and energy. A too high threshold is not very effective, preventing the individual to appropriately 
react to important stimuli, thus putting him at risk (Nagasako, Oaklander, & Dworkin, 2003). 
The second variable that we must consider is the “Reaction Time”. This indicates the time that elapses 
between sensory circuit activation by the onset of a stimulus, and the moment when the corresponding 
response is available and starts running (Donders, 1969; S. Sternberg, 1969; Meyer, Irwin, Osman, & 
Kounois, 1988; Meyer, Osman, Irwin, & Yantis, 1988; Jensen, 2006; Kosinski, 2008). We can infer that, the 
shorter the nervous system takes to choose the most suitable response (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Doya, 
2008; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010), even if inhibitory (Gordon D. Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984), the greater the 
chances of survival. 
Third, it is clear that speed to find a response can save the life of an organism, but it is also true that the 
“Accuracy” is crucial in most cases. In this sense, we define “accuracy” as the difference between the 
response and the best possible option to respond to a stimulus, considering that both are characterized by 
a set of variables, such as intensity, specificity, location, timing, sequencing, etc... Each of these variables 
has an operating range within which we can say it is effective. Thus, we say that a response is effective 
when the accuracy of all variables is within the range that successfully solves the triggering stimulus. For 
example, a tennis player is effective if he hits the ball hard enough, in the right direction, within a limited 
time window, in a specific spatial zone, so that it passes through the network falling anywhere within the 
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attacking half. We say that he is accurate if, in addition and intentionally, gets to place the ball to a certain 
point where he knows his opponent will not reach it. He will be precise if he can place the ball away from 
his opponent consistently. 
If we consider that the nervous system is a specialized system to process information to elaborate 
responses, and that the quality of their responses is given by the three critical variables already identified, it 
makes sense that evolution had selected some strategies to optimize these variables, allowing it to improve 
its overall performance. The very existence of the following biological mechanisms that implement these 
strategies could be considered a confirmation of the importance of these three variables.  
Thus, mechanisms such as “Memory” (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley, 1992) able to encode, store and 
quickly retrieve previously processed information, making it suitable for being efficiently incorporated in 
new processes and operated again. “Pattern Recognition” which allows to share information, encoding it 
with fewer connections, saving resources (Attwell & Laughlin, 2001), more quickly and perhaps reusing 
already developed responses. Predictive Systems (Davidson & Wolpert, 2005; Bar, 2011; Kveraga, Ghuman, 
& Bar, 2007) which can recognize patterns that occur separated in time or sequences that, according to our 
reasoning, are closely related to memory capacity (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). 
Feedforward, which starting with a “prediction” coming from predictive systems, is able to activate in 
advance neural and physiological components of the responses, thus creating faster circuits to send 
activation information through shortest paths (Chklovskii, Mel, & Svoboda, 2004; Serre, Oliva, & Poggio, 
2007). Feedback, that acts as a regulating element, allowing nervous system to dynamically adjust its 
operation by checking the effectiveness of its own responses and the effects they exert on the eliciting 
stimuli. For example, efferent copy which, combined with the inverse models (Wolpert, Miall, & Kawato, 
1998), give place to the corollary discharge (Crapse & Sommer, 2008) allowing us to explain for example 
why we cannot tickle ourselves (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). Mirror 
System (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) makes it possible to anticipate the actions of other individuals, as well 
as imitation (Schaal, 1999; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2009; Monfardini et al., 2013), thus 
triggering advanced social interactions and behaviors (Iacoboni, 2009; Soressi et al., 2013). Or a high-level 
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strategy to optimize the critical variables like Mental Imagery (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001). If the 
information developed through predictive systems is re-fed through sensory circuits (Decety, 1996; Hétu et 
al., 2013), it can be managed as new self-generated stimuli, which in turn can elicit new responses, either 
neural or physiological (Milton, Small, & Solodkin, 2008; MacIntyre, Moran, Collet, & Guillot, 2013; Guillot, 
Di Rienzo, & Collet, 2012). In turn, this self-generated information could be in the basis of self and social 
interactions (Decety & Grèzes, 2006), which is a good example of an advanced system that emerges as a 
combination of simpler ones. Table 1 summarizes how these strategies improve the overall quality of the 
nervous system responses through an optimization of the three critical variables we have already 
identified. 
Table-1. Optimization strategies and critical variables. 
Strategies Variables 
 Activation threshold Reaction time Accuracy 
Memory  Improved Improved 
Pattern recognition  Improved Improved 
Predictive systems Improved Improved Improved 
Feedforward Improved Improved  
Feedback Improved  Improved 
Mirror system  Improved Improved 
Mental Imagery  Improved Improved 
    
 
1.4. Automaticity 
There is, however, a very important factor we should take into account. The three variables we have 
identified as critical to assess the quality of nervous system responses (activation threshold, reaction time 
and accuracy) are interdependent. This means that when modifying one of them, the others will be 
affected by this change. If we want to improve the accuracy we need to spend more time to generate and 
explore more alternatives (Garrett, 1922; Hick, 1952; Wickelgren, 1977; Meyer, Irwin, et al., 1988), but if 
we take too long it may happen that, when we finally find the best response it is no longer needed, either 
because the predator has devoured us, or because our potential partner has found another partner 
(Chittka, Skorupski, & Raine, 2009). Also, if we reduce the reaction time, the quality of response suffers and 
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may no longer be accurate enough to successfully resolve the stimulus that elicited it, thus becoming 
ineffective. If we displayed unnecessary responses, even if accurate and fast, we may waste our energy and 
time solving problems that do not require it (Missenard & Fernandez, 2011; Lan, Sartori, Neumann, Sourjik, 
& Tu, 2012), thus diminishing the availability of resources to address other and more important tasks. 
The interdependence between these three critical variables is the greatest challenge the nervous system 
has to front when facing a stimulus. It should be able to find, at any time and for each stimulus, the best 
possible balance between them (Paulus et al., 2009). 
The best way to achieve this optimum balance would be having, since the beginning, a specific neural 
circuit, already "wired" to provide the most accurate response in the shortest time possible, and fine-tuned 
to run only when it is really necessary. As it is the optimal mechanism, evolution have developed and 
selected as a priority and, because of its importance, it has also incorporated it at genetic level. This kind of 
circuits are known as Reflex Circuits (Purves, 2004; Barrett & Ganong, 2010) which allows the living beings 
to deploy a first type of highly optimized responses called Innate Responses. According to this reasoning, 
the more responses are available in the form of reflexes, the better the balance between the critical 
variables that define its quality, and thus the better the overall system performance. 
But this raises a new problem. Given the enormous variety and variability of possible stimuli that a living 
being can front (the also called Combinatorial Explosion), it is obvious that not all responses can be 
genetically "wired" into a reflex circuit. The nervous system cannot, and should not, incorporate innately 
coded all the possible responses (Bateson & Mameli, 2007), but the mechanisms to dynamically generate 
them in the most flexible and rapid way. As responses are encoded by networks of neurons and synapses, 
are the developing and neural plasticity processes (neurogenesis, synaptogenesis, LTP, LTD, neuronal 
apoptosis, synaptic pruning, etc…), along with the already described feedback and feed-forward 
mechanisms, which have to dynamically create and select the fastest, more effective and efficient networks 
(Raichle et al., 1994; Petersen, Mier, Fiez, & Raichle, 1998; Citri & Malenka, 2007; Kaiser & Peters, 2009; 
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Tau & Peterson, 2009; Chechik, Meilijson, & Ruppin, 1998). This optimization process leads to different 
levels of search, development, selection and implementation of responses we will see in the next section.  
So, we call Automaticity to the process by which, the neural pathway associated to a response, reaches its 
optimal balance of interconnection between its elements, thus providing the best possible relationship 
between the three critical variables that characterize its quality. See (See Moors & De Houwer, 2006 for a 
review) for a review. 
This doesn’t mean that an automated response is the best possible response to solve a particular stimulus 
(G. D Logan, 1985; Yarrow, Brown, & Krakauer, 2009) but, that once found the best response available 
within the limitations of the individual capacities in a given context, the neural network that encodes it is 
optimized to do three things: recognize the stimulative pattern, compute the response and run it as quickly 
and accurately as possible (W. Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Richard M. Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; R.M. 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1984). Thus, the automaticity concept refers to the response execution quality. 
Depending on the intrinsic characteristics of the stimulus, it will be more, less or even not susceptible to be 
automated. The different degrees of automaticity give place to skills (Hikosaka, Yamamoto, Yasuda, & Kim, 
2013), habits which are defined as “sequential, repetitive, motor, or cognitive behaviors elicited by external 
or internal triggers that, once released, can go to completion without constant conscious oversight” 
(Graybiel, 2008, p. 361), or even addictions. The most significant characteristics of automated responses 
are that the sensory events almost always elicit the behavior, are resistant to dual-task interference, that is, 
the behavior can be executed successfully while the subject is simultaneously engaged in some other 
demanding secondary task (Michael I. Posner & Snyder, 1975; G.D. Logan, 1979), they are behaviorally 
inflexible, and unaffected by reward devaluation (Ashby & Crossley, 2012). 
Based on this definition, we state the Automaticity Principle: 
As a result of its own mechanisms of growth and development, and to fully optimize their 
effectiveness and efficiency, the nervous system will automate, as much as possible, the new 
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circuits and neural networks that encode a stimulus recognition, calculation and execution of the 
response associated to it. 
As expected if it was a fundamental functional mechanism, automaticity has been systematically observed 
in several and different studies and with different sensory, cognitive and motor requirements, like motor 
skills (Poldrack et al., 2005), driving (Charlton & Starkey, 2011), reading (Gordon D. Logan, 1997), music 
reading and playing (Stewart, 2005), and typing (Shaffer, 1975), among others. It has also been observed in 
learning processes that affect very different memory systems, whether declarative or procedural (Ashby & 
Crossley, 2012), and also in very different species (Helton, 2007). Despite its ubiquity, the neural bases for 
this mechanism are not clear yet, though it seems probed that prefrontal cortex (PFC) and basal ganglia 
(BG), mainly the cortico-striatum-cortical loops, are intimately related with the automaticity process (Hélie, 
Ell, & Ashby, 2015). Thus, the two competing paradigms, the automaticity as a “Transfer of Control from the 
Associative Striatum to the Sensorimotor Striatum” (Ashby, Turner, & Horvitz, 2010) and the automaticity as 
a “Transfer of Control from the Striatum to Cortex” (Belin, Jonkman, Dickinson, Robbins, & Everitt, 2009; Yin 
& Knowlton, 2006) , have received wide experimental support, and opened the need for future research. 
As a summary of this topic, we consider that the automation process can be understood as the process 
going from a “discrete” set of multidimensional values obtained on a limited number of cases, to a 
“continuous” multidimensional function codified after a large number of events (Fig. 1) 
 
Figure 1. Automaticity conceptualization 
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1.5. Levels of response 
We have already seen that the first kind of responses the nervous system has available to react to stimuli 
are Innate Responses (Mameli & Bateson, 2011). We say these responses are "wired" because it exists, 
since birth, a specific neural circuitry to resolve the stimulus. The same stimulus will produce the same 
response. The fact that the origin of this type of response is genetic, means that it has been preserved by  
species over generations, which in turn tells us that it has been useful in solving certain very specific, 
ancestral, frequent and repetitive stimuli. Among them we can mention crying, coughing, pupillary dilation 
to changes in light, sweat secretion or control heart rate and breathing, among others. Within innate 
responses we include reflexes (Purves, 2004), the Fixed Action Patterns or instincts, defined as "patterns of 
behavior that are fully functional from the first time they are executed, even if the individual has had no 
previous experience with the stimuli that elicit the response " (Alcock & Farley, 2001, p. 118). 
But what happens if, because of the novelty or the variability of a stimulus, there isn’t an innate response 
that allows solving it? The nervous system must develop new responses from the available elements. We 
call this new level of response Cognitive Responses. They form a broad set of strategies, more or less 
advanced, which enable the body to create new solutions to address the most diverse stimuli (Quartz & 
Sejnowski, 1997). These strategies are very flexible, but have the disadvantage of requiring more time and 
resources to find or develop, select and apply a response, thus reducing the biological fitness. This second 
level of responses is useful when either there is no other effective response, or the response time is not 
critical. 
Once the brain, within its own capacity, finds the best possible response to a repetitive stimulus, it gets into 
action the automaticity principle that tries to create the most optimal pathway to process and execute the 
response, when necessary and do it as quickly and accurately as possible. This results in a third type of 
responses we call Automated Responses (Raichle et al., 1994; Petersen et al., 1998). 
It is important to note the difference between innate automatic responses and automated responses. 
While all the innate responses are genetic (Manoli, Meissner, & Baker, 2006) and therefore automatic since 
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the beginning, the automated responses do not exist at first. They must be first generated through a 
cognitive process in the form of cognitive responses, which are later optimized, as expressed by the 
automaticity principle, though not all the responses are susceptible to be automated. 
This way, and attending to their availability, we define a three level hierarchical structure for responses, 
starting with innate responses at the lowest level, going through cognitive responses and then finishing 
with automated responses. Now we will summarize the three different response levels we will use from 
now on: 
Innate responses: Implemented by specific neural pathways, genetically encoded and selected to 
solve common situations, from the evolutionary point of view, which are highly critical for the 
survival of the organism. Provide automatic responses, very fast, accurate and highly efficient in 
their use of resources and very effective since the evolution has selected and preserved in the 
inherited baggage of the species over millions of years. 
Cognitive responses: Developed by advanced information processing systems that enable the 
search for new responses to face novel stimuli, of very different complexity, repetitive or not, and 
less critical for survival. They have many strategies and multiple ways of combining them to find 
solutions, but it implies longer analysis times and broader resource utilization, resulting in higher 
energy expenditure. It is important to note that cognitive responses are developed for a specific 
range of operation, the experienced one, and that if this range is overpassed, the cognitive 
response may become ineffective again. 
Automated responses: Developed by the brain optimization mechanisms that, once a new 
cognitive response has been found, enable the creation, selection and pruning of those neural 
circuits aimed at making automatic the new cognitive response. It is useful to optimize responses to 
repetitive stimuli, of diverse complexity, which are susceptible to be automated. The effectiveness 
and efficiency are reached with repeated exposure to stimuli, improving accuracy and speed as the 
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new created network consolidates. It needs more time to have these responses available and the 
process consumes more resources.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Returning briefly to the evolutionary level, we can see that there are species that exhibit one, two or all 
three levels of response. Since evolution does not develop or maintain systems if they are not necessary, 
we can reason that the different levels of response emerged as a result of adaptive pressure exerted on 
organisms by their environment. In other words, any organism whose environmental conditions would 
have allowed it to survive and reproduce without problems displaying only innate responses, there will not 
have invested resources to develop and maintain more advanced and costly brains. This explains why there 
are animals, like horseshoe crab, that have survived for hundreds of millions of years without the need to 
strengthen its nervous system beyond a certain level of response. Another example would be sharks, living 
on earth for about 420 million years, what means seventy times the period that separates us humans from 
chimpanzees (6-7 million years), and have not developed intelligence levels similar to ours. 
Table - 2. Types of responses by its origin and grade of automaticity. 
 Genetic Developed 
  Cognitive Responses 
 
 
Non-
automatic  
 Problem resolution 
 Planning 
 Decision making 
… 
 
Automaticity 
process 
 
 
Automatic 
Innate Responses Automated Responses 
Reflex Skills 
Fixed Action Patterns Habits 
Instincts Emotions  Addictions 
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1.6. Response structure 
Regardless of the level to which a response may belong, it could include two types of complementary 
components that may or may not activate simultaneously: 
- A Physiological component that includes autonomic and somatic systems with corresponding 
motor elements, endocrine, heart rate, blood pressure, etc., and is directed to allow the body to 
run the necessary physiological activation and physical actions to face the stimulus. 
- A Neural component that will trigger the activation or regulation of other neural networks, thus 
initiating new complementary brain processes (e.g. imagining). 
But all those components are dynamically activated and inhibited along time, thus giving place to different 
“stages”, each with its own set of active components (Dezfouli, Lingawi, & Balleine, 2014). Thus, a 
response, like a process it is, will be composed of a sequence of stages, each with its own set of 
physiological and/or neural components simultaneously activated (Bapi, Pammi, Miyapuram, & Ahmed, 
2005) that are generated in different networks. This is a very important key for the reasoning we will do 
later. Therefore, finding a new cognitive response is the process to identify, select, order in time and link 
together the appropriate sequence of stages necessary to face a stimulus. Automaticity is the process by 
which that response is “wired” in a new specific neural network or pathway (Dezfouli et al., 2014). 
1.7. Response assessment 
Optimization has been the keystone for all our reasoning up to here; the nervous system must generate a 
response that effectively address the stimulus, only if necessary, and do it as quickly, accurately and with 
the least consumption of resources as possible. We have also seen how, to improve their performance, the 
nervous system has developed multiple strategies in their architecture and dynamics (memory, pattern 
recognition, predictive systems, feedback, feed-forward, mirror system, automaticity) and different levels 
of response (innate, cognitive and automated) that allow it to optimize both, the three critical variables 
(activation threshold, reaction time and accuracy), and the interdependence between them. Thus, different 
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strategies will be optimal depending on the context and the criticality, the novelty, the complexity and the 
variability of stimuli to solve. 
But all these systems and strategies would be useless if the nervous system, once deployed a response, 
could not evaluate its success or failure. If an innate response was not effective solving a critical stimulus, 
the brain would fail in its function, with the consequent risk to the organism's survival. How does the brain 
evaluate the effectiveness of their responses? 
In addition, and in order to achieve the goal of optimization, there should be some mechanism to enable 
and disable different levels of response on demand, as they are needed or not. Before activating cognitive 
systems, more advanced, but also expensive and slow, nervous system try to resolve the stimuli using 
innate and automated response levels, faster, more accurate and economic. 
When possible, the brain uses predictive systems to generate an anticipated representation or expectation, 
both interoceptive and exteroceptive of the new characteristics of the stimulus once modified by its own 
response (Wolpert et al., 1998; Friston, 2010). Subsequently, the brain uses this expectation like a 
reference for comparison with the actual information received through the senses, once deployed the 
response (Blakemore et al., 2000). Importantly, this same process is also performed to neural information 
that, through feedback and feedforward loops, is processed without the intervention of afferent sensory 
and motor circuits, as in the case of thought or imagination (Phelps et al., 2001). Thus, we consider that a 
response is effective if, by using some of the diverse strategies we will expose below, it is able to match 
the stimulus and the expectation information.  
Therefore, if a mismatch occurs, a specific response, if available, will be elicited. But what happens if there 
is no specific response available, because it is a novel stimulus? What if there is no expectation with which 
to compare it? And what if both match but, at a certain time, they stop matching? What if multiple and 
different expectations exist for the same stimulus? 
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1.8. Emotions 
From an operational point of view, the best option to address these circumstances would be to have a 
system as fast as possible, innate and therefore automatic, which is enabled by default to minimize the 
possibility of failure, capable of generating a wide range of general purpose responses and to trigger the 
basic actions needed to address novel, variable or unexpected stimuli. This system is what we call 
Emotional System and its responses are Emotions. 
Thus, a stimulus could be unexpected, or could be expected but not having an effective response to face it, 
or could be that there exist different expectations about the same stimulus, all of them with different 
response availability and also with different degrees of efficacy. For example, a predator could be, to some 
extent, “expected” by the prey, but not so the moment or the way it is going to attack (expectation 
mismatch); when the attack occurs, and depending on its experientially-acquired skills, the prey will or not 
have a specific response  (response availability); even if the prey is able to deploy a specific response, it is 
not sure it will be completely effective (response efficacy); maybe the prey can recall what happened to 
others in the herd, some of which were devoured and others escaped (different expectations and maybe 
different responses for the same stimulus). All this different casuistic, which implies different functional 
elements along the information processing chain, will elicit an emotional response.  
According with this reasoning, and though emotion definition is an active debate (Dixon, 2012) , we give 
now a first partial definition of emotions as innate contingency action programs, which act as “indicators” 
about the incapacity of the already available responses, to effectively resolve a triggering stimulus in a 
given context.  
Thus, the first two actions to be carried out by the emotional system are complementary and simultaneous, 
and are of two types: 
- Contingency, displaying innate stereotypical responses to allow the individual to start managing 
the stimulus (e.g. fight or flight), and saving time while finding or developing a new and more 
specific and effective cognitive response to resolve it. This component of emotional responses has 
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been systematically observed both in animals and humans (Peter J. Lang & Davis, 2006; LeDoux, 
2012).  
- Regulation, eliciting the selective potentiation or inhibition of higher cognitive mechanisms, more 
advanced but slower, expensive in energy consumption and fewer, to find or develop a new, more 
specific and more effective response (Kastner & Ungerleider, 2001; Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 
2002). We develop this point in more depth when we introduce the “attention” topic. 
It is worth noting that, unlike the model based on the concept of “interruption” (Simon, 1967) that 
considers emotions as “deviations” from the normal flow of information processing to cope with an 
unexpected event, our theory considers the emotional system as the main innate network for processing 
sensory information, being actively inhibited only in the case that an effective response, whether innate, 
cognitive or automated already exist.  That is, if a completely novel stimulus appears, a specific response 
won’t be available, so an emotion will be elicited. Anyway, to appropriately explain this approach we 
previously need to introduce some more concepts, so this point will be developed in more depth later on. 
1.9. Attention 
At this point, we have to face a new challenge. The brain, through the multiple afferent sensory and 
feedback loops it possesses, permanently receives a huge amount of information from numerous stimuli, 
both exogenous and endogenous (Chica, Bartolomeo, & Lupiáñez, 2013; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). In 
many cases these stimuli coincide or overlap in time (Fries, 2009), and must be discriminated, targeted 
and/or simultaneously attended, through a process of "binding" (Bosman et al., 2012; Ungerleider & Bell, 
2011). But the characteristics of each stimulus are different, which may cause a great increase in 
computational requirements. 
To solve this problem, the nervous system could develop as many advanced circuitry as necessary, but this 
would contradict one of the basic principles that we first stated in our analysis. The efficiency principle tells 
us that, as an evolutionary system it is, the nervous system must adjust its development and capabilities to 
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minimize, as far as possible, the consumption of resources and time used to fulfill its function, but without 
compromising its effectiveness. 
This fact has some important effects for understanding brain dynamics: 
1- The brain does not develop and even eliminates those neural pathways that are not needed or are 
inefficient (neuronal apoptosis and synaptic pruning) (Low & Cheng, 2006). 
2- The brain adjusts the capabilities of those systems which remain necessary, and does so in 
accordance with the likely characteristics of number, frequency, complexity, variability and 
simultaneity of the stimuli to be solved (plasticity). 
3- Once a stimulus has been fully resolved, and following the efficiency principle, the brain doesn’t 
apply on it higher capacity mechanisms. 
In addition, the automaticity principle tells us that once a response is found for a repetitive stimulus, and 
independently of whether it is completely or just partially effective, the brain will try, if possible, to 
automate its execution the most, as a way to optimize the balance between the critical variables that 
define its quality, thus giving place to skills and, sometimes also, to habits and even addictions.  
From the application of these two principles (efficiency and automaticity) we can infer, on the one hand, 
the relationships between the number, the energy cost and the computational power of available 
resources and, in the other hand, the frequency, the variability and the complexity of the stimuli the brain 
must solve. Thus, we can reason that generally and throughout the evolutionary process, the number of 
simple and repetitive stimuli is greater than the complex and highly variable stimuli. We also know that 
many of the complex stimuli can be decomposed into simpler ones (Lerner, Hendler, Ben-Bashat, Harel, & 
Malach, 2001; Grill-Spector, 2003; Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Ungerleider & Bell, 2011). Thus, 
simple and repetitive stimuli may be managed by simpler, more numerous innate or automated pathways, 
allowing parallel management while, more complex, novel and heterogeneous stimuli, require the joint 
intervention of more advanced, shortly automated and less numerous networks to be solved. 
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All these reasoning leads us to conclude that, the more novel, complex and variable the stimulus to resolve, 
the greater the necessary computing power and thus the lower the number of advanced networks available 
to carry out this function (Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013).  
Because of this limitation of resources, conflicts often arise when accessing the cognitive resources 
(Grossberg & Levine, 1987; Marois & Ivanoff, 2005). This justifies the need for the brain to provide a 
mechanism that allows it to filter and select which stimuli, when, and for how long should have priority 
when using the advanced resources available. A classic example of interference, the color Stroop Effect 
(MacLeod, 1991; MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000), shows us what happens when two processes try to use the 
same system, in this case the verbalization system, to carry out its task, thus interfering each other. The 
more automated process due to daily lives, in this case the reading of written text (e.g. blue), prevails over 
the task of verbalizing the color in which the text is written (e.g. red), which is a much less common task. 
But not only the novelty, complexity and variability of different stimuli are involved in the process. When 
assessing which stimuli must have priority, there is a fundamental variable that, from an evolutionary 
standpoint, can make a clear difference to the survival of a living being: the Criticality of the stimulus that 
requests the resources. If a critical process, independently of its complexity and variability, does not receive 
priority access to the most advanced tools, the result can be fatal for the organism.   
To face these problems there is a specialized set of systems (Raz & Buhle, 2006) to effectively perform the 
task of alerting, orienting, filtering, prioritization and resource allocation: Attention (Norman & Shallice, 
1986; M. I Posner & Petersen, 1990; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Petersen & Posner, 2012). Their mission is 
to assess the various simultaneous requests to access different cognitive resources, prioritize and allow 
them to optimally access those resources depending on their characteristics. But, how can the attentional 
system evaluate the priority of different stimuli which are concurrently requiring access to cognitive 
systems? 
According to our theory, attention makes use of emotional information as a mean to prioritize and 
resolve conflicts when giving access to the cognitive resources, thus assigning the available resources to 
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different stimuli according to their criticality. This structure assigns a new role to emotions, complementary 
to those already described of contingency and regulation: the qualification of stimuli priority according to 
their own critical characteristics, their simultaneity, the actual internal state and workload in the system.  
Thus, we can now give a complete operational definition of what we understand as emotions, which are 
described as “innate contingency action programs, which act as “indicators” about the incapacity of the 
already available responses to effectively resolve a triggering stimulus in a given context, thus qualifying 
the stimulus’ priority to compete for cognitive resources”.  
By applying criticality maps (Fecteau & Munoz, 2006) over emotional information, and together with 
workload information, attention computes priority for the different concurrent stimuli, thus creating and 
adjusting what we call Attentional Windows, namely selecting and filtering a greater or lesser number of 
simultaneous stimuli (Vuilleumier, 2005), and letting the most advanced resources to act on them. As a 
result of this process, attentional windows are continually readjusted in focus and size. Therefore, stimuli 
can be processed in parallel and integrated if they do not require access to the same cognitive network 
(Pessoa, 2010a), such as when we simultaneously process the image and the sound of a movie, or can be 
filtered, such as when we selectively listen a conversation among others in a party (Fritz, Elhilali, David, & 
Shamma, 2007). When an emotion-paired stimulus with high criticality is presented, the attentional 
window is reduced and focused on the stimulus associated with it. For example, the slowing effect of 
temporal perception (Eagleman, 2008), tunnel vision (Godnig, 2003) and auditory exclusion, phenomena 
very documented by combatants in situations of high stress (Artwohl, 2002; Drzewiecki, 2002). When there 
are no urgent requests, attention prioritizes less critical stimulus. At every moment we are exposed to lots 
of low criticality stimuli, both sensory and cognitive, so that attention has always some information to 
process. 
It is important to note that we have not yet introduced the notion of “awareness” and so, attend to a 
stimulus doesn’t mean to be aware of it (Lamme, 2010). In that sense, and though we will expose in more 
depth below, it is worth clarifying that we clearly differentiate among attention (mechanism to prioritize 
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concurrent access to shared resources), orienting (e.g. the fact of fixing gaze in a stimulus) and “awareness” 
(be able to relate the occurrence of a stimulus). Thus, we can attend to different stimuli, with or without 
orienting and do it unconsciously (Armony & Vuilleumier, 2013, Chapter 14; Pessoa, 2013, Chapter 4). For 
example, in an unpublished experiment (Garcés, 2003) where subjects were rewarded when successfully 
detecting palindromic car plates while driving, we observed how the searching and assessment process, 
which initially needed to be effortful and consciously attended, gradually (in 3-4 months) became 
completely unattended, automatic and unconscious. Moreover, even when the task became unrewarded, 
and more than five years after the experiment finalization, most of the subjects reported about the 
persistence of that acquired capacity. It is interesting to note that all subjects also reported that, after 
reaching automaticity, palindromic plates, and only those, appear like suddenly capturing gaze and 
“jumping” into consciousness, with no subjective sensation to have been looking up for them, but eliciting a 
pleasant emotion when they became conscious. Interestingly, many subjects report that some of the 
“jumping” plates were numerically incorrect (not a palindromic number), but usually they were 
morphologically very similar to correct ones (e.g. 8838). This fact reinforces the possibility for the existence 
of an emotional network that works with coarse (low spatial frequency) information, before recruiting 
more advanced orienting and attentional resources (Vuilleumier, 2005). 
Summarizing this paragraph, given the constraints the evolution process applies to living beings, not all the 
stimuli can be processed at the same time through specific networks. Therefore, stimuli must share a set of 
different “hub” resources, recruited into dynamic networks, to achieve the cognitive processes necessary 
to find or execute a response. The management of those resources is regulated and controlled by 
attentional systems that, according with our reasoning, use emotional information together with criticality 
maps to assess the priority of every different and simultaneous stimulus. 
1.10. Innate and acquired attentional capacities 
It is logical to think that, along the developmental process and early after birth, the individual only has 
available a few very specific (e.g. coughing) or very general (e.g. orienting reflex, startle) innate reflexive 
responses (Viding, Sebastian, & McCrory, 2013). As these innate responses alone are not yet able to 
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effectively resolve most of the novel stimuli the individual is front with, emotions — in the sense we have 
just defined — will be permanently elicited to regulate and prioritize attentional processes.  
It is worth noting that, according with this reasoning, at birth, the most of stimuli will be emotion-laden 
(e.g. a baby gets startled even with his own hands’ movements), and will be the dynamic processes 
(cognition, automation, habituation, extinction, etc…) which will gradually modify or not this status (see 
section 3). Thus, we consider that, at birth, all attentional processes begin as basic general purpose 
reflexes, such as orienting reflex (Evgeny N. Sokolov, Spinks, Näätänen, & Lyytinen, 2002), hardly influenced 
and regulated by what we have defined as emotions. 
Experiments have shown that additional attentional capacities, such as voluntary orienting, sustained, 
focused or peripheral attention, arise as the individual develops along childhood and adolescence (Lellis et 
al., 2013). We consider these advanced attentional processes as necessary subtasks of what we have called 
cognitive responses and, as such, would follow a similar experience-related development (Raz & Buhle, 
2006, p. 370 Box 1). As an example, we can refer the different attentional phenomena related with the 
“cocktail party effect” where voluntary (e.g. change the conversation we are listening to) or involuntary 
mechanisms (e.g. orienting when our name is pronounced in that noisy environment) show how attention 
can be differentially modulated (Fritz et al., 2007). 
In that sense, we also consider motivation and goal-directed attention regulation mechanisms (Corbetta, 
Patel, & Shulman, 2008) as an extension of emotionally-regulated attentional processes where external 
cues in the former (e.g. monetary reward) or internal ones in the latter (e.g. a face to look for in a crowd) 
need to be previously associated to first or second order conditioned stimulus, thus inheriting their capacity 
to elicit an emotion that in turn regulates attention (CITA ver Armony y Vuillemieur 2013) . For example, a 
concept like “money” is culturally acquired and linked to positive (e.g. pleasure when buying goods) or 
negative (e.g. fear to go bankrupt) emotional processes. In turn, the concept “money” can be successively 
associated to new stimulus (e.g. lottery ticket) which in turn will inherit the capacity to elicit an emotional 
response to influence attentional processes. 
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In addition, as those advanced attentional subtasks have a wider scope than more specific cognitive 
subtasks, many different cognitive processes will repeatedly make use of them, thus inducing the advanced 
attentional capacities to be automated, becoming themselves high-level efficient sub-processes, operating 
over multimodal information to effectively achieve their alerting, orienting, filtering, searching and 
executive functions.  
Importantly, as both, innate and acquired attentional sub-processes can’t operate at the same time on the 
same resources, we postulate that innate systems are gradually and actively inhibited as more specific and 
effective responses are developed and automated (Whalen & Phelps, 2009, p. 54).  
According with all this reasoning, emotion-attention interactions wouldn’t be a linear function, thus 
depending on many different factors such as novelty of the stimulus, the existence or not of effective 
innate, cognitive or automated responses to face it, contextual information, simultaneity with other stimuli, 
saliency, expectations, or the existence of goal-oriented or motivated active processes. All these factors will 
determine the activation, or not, of different networks, within different levels and at different moments. 
Thus, our model offers a way to explain the gradual shift from basic innate attentional capacities, to the 
more advanced and acquired attentional capacities. As more cognitive responses are developed, also are 
their advanced  attentional capacities, which gradually exerts increased inhibition over the innate ones, 
given that the new cognitive-attentional pathways not only become fast enough (Pessoa, 2013), but also 
much more specific, and thus more effective and efficient than the general-purpose innate capacities. For 
instance, this shift of attentional processes from innate toward acquired attentional networks could give 
account of the execution interference that appears when an already automated behavior is again executed 
under conscious control (Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002). This neural shifting mechanism could 
also be implied in the capacity that goal-oriented tasks have to block emotional distractors (Vogt, De 
Houwer, & Crombez, 2011; Vogt, De Houwer, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2013; Pessoa, 2013). 
This approach is consistent with the most recent advances in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, thus 
letting us to go, from more classical attentional models based on “low” (innate, subcortical, coarse and 
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quick) and “high” (developed, cortical, fine, and slow) dual pathways (Vuilleumier, 2005, p. 589 Box 2), to 
more flexible models based on “dynamic networks” (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Pessoa, 2013), which 
consider that emotion-attention interactions dynamically recruit multiple and heterogeneous resources, 
whether innate or acquired, to form flexible networks to resolve a stimulus  (Pessoa, 2010a).  
 
Figure 2. Visual pathways. a | A traditional flowchart of visual processing typically emphasizes the LGN –
V1–V2–V4–TEO–tE pathway, although the scheme is not strictly hierarchical. The amygdala, in particular, is 
a recipient of visual signals from the anterior visual cortex. According to the ‘standard hypothesis’, a 
subcortical pathway involving the superior colliculus and the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus provides fast 
and automatic access to the amygdala. b | An alternative view of the flow of visual signals includes multiple 
pathways, including both alternative routes (for example, LGN to MT) and shortcuts (for example, V2 to 
TEO). Only some of these are shown. The flow of visual information may be more appropriately viewed in 
terms of ‘multiple waves’ of activation that initiate and refine cell responses at a given processing ‘stage’. 
For simplicity, feedback pathways, which are known to be quite extensive, have been omitted. The 
existence of such feedback pathways dictates, however, that a complex ebb-and-flow of activation sculpts 
the neuronal profile of activation throughout the visual cortex, and likewise the amygdala responses. Some 
of the connections between the pulvinar and visual cortex, and between the pulvinar and ‘associational’ 
areas, are also indicated. The line in the pulvinar is intended to schematically separate the medial pulvinar 
(to the right of the line) from the rest of the structure. FEF, frontal eye field; LGN, lateral geniculate 
nucleus; MT, medial temporal area (also known as v5); OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; SC, superior colliculus; TE, 
inferior temporal area TE; TEO, inferior temporal area TEO; V, visual cortex; vLPFc, ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex. Reproduced with permission from Pessoa & Adolphs 2010. 
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in that sense, and though further research is needed to elucidate the different networks implied in different 
attentional capacities, it seems clear that the anatomical components that functional experiments relate 
with emotional processing (amygdala, pulvinar, hypothalamus, basal forebrain, cingulate, ventro-medial, 
lateral, and orbitofrontal cortex) are among the most widely interconnected areas in the brain. This fact 
makes possible for the emotional processes to mobilize and engage multiple sensory, perceptual, motor 
and cognitive resources, together with bodily and homeostatic ones (Pessoa, 2013), as our model 
postulates. 
Despite of multiple subcortical pathways that have been associated with emotional regulation of attention 
(Armony & Vuilleumier, 2013; Pessoa, 2013), it is worth to highlight the special relevance of the amygdala, 
that not only is one of the most interconnected regions of the brain, but also receives and sends highly 
processed information from multimodal cortices (Pessoa, 2010b) for both, negative and also positive 
valence stimuli. If we take into account the functions we have just assigned to emotions (contingency, 
regulation and prioritization), amygdala seems to play an important role “receiving relevant affective 
sensory information from cortex and thalamus, or memorized information from hippocampus and, in turn, 
activating other brain structures implied in orienting, vigilance, enhanced perceptual processing and 
efferent structures implied in defensive and appetitive reflex actions” (P. J. Lang, 2014, p. 93). Some studies 
have shown that amygdala can regulate and enhance the attention to critical emotional stimuli (e.g. fearful 
faces) by modulating the activity even in the primary visual cortex (Pessoa, 2010a; Pourtois, Grandjean, 
Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004; Santesso et al., 2008), while simultaneously suppressing attention to less 
critical stimuli (Kastner & Ungerleider, 2001). Thus, the amygdala has become a main functional element 
for emotional regulation of attentional processes (Pessoa, 2010a, p. 438), being itself also gradually 
regulated as cognitive responses, including acquired attentional subtasks, are developed. For example, fear 
conditioned experiments have demonstrated the active inhibition of amygdala central nucleus (CE) by 
infralimbic ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Ciocchi et al., 2010; Hartley & Phelps, 2009). On the 
other side, amygdala seems to be necessary for fear learning and recognition in early childhood, but not 
later, as some experiments with bilateral damage at different ages have shown (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, 
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& Damasio, 1994; Hamann, Stefanacci, Squire, Adolphs, & al, 1996). Thus, our reasoning about “functional 
shifting” could give some clues to understand the intact capacity, observed in adults with bilateral 
amygdala damage, to quickly and unconsciously detect fearful faces (Tsuchiya, Moradi, Felsen, Yamazaki, & 
Adolphs, 2009). 
Summarizing this paragraph, as new cognitive responses are gradually developed, also are their advanced 
attentional subtasks, which in turn become highly effective and efficient sub-processes. These new 
attentional subtasks will dynamically make use of either innate or acquired resources, depending on their 
necessities, thus giving place to different networks activation. At the same time, and to avoid mutually 
interfering, innate general-purpose attentional capacities will be silenced through an active inhibition 
mechanism, also developed as a necessary part of new cognitive responses. Thus, a shifting process from 
innate to acquired attentional capacities, together with automaticity of those acquired capacities, could 
give account of several observed phenomena (See Domínguez-Borrás & Vuilleumier, 2013 for a review). 
1.11. Cognitive systems 
According to our model, cognitive systems are responsible to find new, more specific, effective and efficient 
responses when the available ones, whether innate, cognitive or even automated, are not able to 
effectively resolve a stimulus, that is, to completely match stimulus and expectation representations. This 
means that, as we will later reason in more depth, cognitive systems are in charge to minimize the 
emotional tensions paired with active stimulative processes, whether exogenous or endogenous.  
Within the category of cognitive systems we include those neural networks capable of implementing 
different strategies, more or less advanced, to process information in a dynamic and innovative way, 
generating solutions of varying complexity, allowing the living being to effectively respond to stimuli. To do 
so, these systems use sensory and previously represented conceptual information (Mahon & Caramazza, 
2009; Martin, 2007; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007), and their relationships, to combine them and 
create new representations that minimize the emotional tension. Within cognitive systems we include from 
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implicit learning or imitation, to decision making, going through working memory, logic, planning and 
prediction systems, theory of mind, language, imagination or deception. 
Once a stimulus gains access to cognitive systems, we must re-apply the principles of efficacy and 
efficiency. The brain must find an effective response, while minimizing the time and resources to do so. To 
do that, it must explore the appropriate cognitive strategies according to the criticality and complexity of 
the proposed task, and only those. The existence of multiple subsystems (Norman & Bobrow, 1975; Miyake 
et al., 2000), with different degrees of expertise and consumption of resources and time, generate a 
hierarchical structure for cognitive systems that define the order in which they will get into action to solve a 
particular problem (Miyake et al., 2000). Sometimes several of them may operate in parallel on the same 
stimulus, while other times they will operate sequentially (Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2004; Paas, van Gog, & 
Sweller, 2010; Bapi et al., 2005). 
Thus, and according with our reasoning, the meaning of cognition do not depends on how sophisticated are 
the systems used to solve the stimuli, but the right balance between the problem, the constrains, the 
system applied and the quality of the response in terms of need, effectiveness, time and resources used to 
find it (R. J. Sternberg & Pretz, 2005; Neubauer & Fink, 2009; Deary, Penke, & Johnson, 2010). This will have 
important implications for the behavior to be discussed later. 
It is worth noting that, as cognitive responses are experientially-acquired responses, their effective range of 
operation will be restricted within the limits of the already experienced stimuli. In case a stimulus exceeds 
that range, the cognitive response could become ineffective, and the emotional response will take the 
control again. This, for example, is the main reason for airplane pilots to get trained in a wide number of 
unlikely risky situations in flight simulators, thus widening the range for which learnt emergency responses 
are valid. The operative range of cognitive responses can also be widen through mental imagery pre-
training, as many combatants and professional athletes usually do (Milton et al., 2008; MacIntyre et al., 
2013; Guillot et al., 2012; Hétu et al., 2013). 
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At the neuroanatomical level, and aligned with our reasoning about the necessity of emotional-cognitive 
loops, the “networks” approach is showing that we can’t identify specific brain regions as “cognitive” or 
“emotional” given that both, cortical and subcortical pathways massively participate in the diffusion-
integration processing of information (Swanson, 2000; Modha & Singh, 2010). Thus, some brain regions 
take part in numerous functions, while the same function can be executed by different regions, giving place 
to conjunctural dynamic assemblies of different circuitry, innate and acquired, to produce a behavior 
(Pessoa, 2014b). Accordingly, we don’t differentiate emotional from cognitive processes by the regions 
involved on their processing, but only on the kind of bottom-up and top-down operations that must be run 
on the stimulus, together with contextual and internal state information, to elicit the primer or the latter 
(Lamme, 2003). Therefore, we displace from the circuit concept to the network concept, where different 
necessities recruit different sets of functions that temporally conform a network (Pessoa, 2014c). In that 
sense, Pessoa recently affirmed that “the neural basis of emotion and cognition should be viewed as 
governed less by properties that are intrinsic to specific sites and more by contextually determined 
interactions among multiple brain regions. In this sense, emotion and cognition are functionally integrated 
systems, namely, they more or less continuously impact each other’s operations” (Pessoa, 2014a). 
As an example of our approach both, an amazonian indigene and an urban man will respond the same, with 
a startle reflex, when they are suddenly exposed to an unknown and unexpected loud noise, while the 
indigene will not respond the same than the urban man before an aimed gun. In the first example, will be 
reflexive networks which completely execute the response, while in the second case the urban man’s brain 
will recruit innate and cognitively-developed representations to assess the stimulus and identify it as a 
threat, thus eliciting an emotional response (Phelps, 2006). A firearm is a meta-concept whose stimulative 
pattern has to be associatively related to its killing capacities and risks through a cognitive process and, 
therefore, initially it has no meaning for the indigene. It is obvious that, though both stimulus, the loud 
noise and the firearm, may elicit a fear response to the urban man, the networks recruited to reach that 
response are not the same. 
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1.12. Consciousness and free will 
Although this issue goes beyond the focus of this paper and we do not intend to give an explanation for the 
“hard problem” of what consciousness is (Blackmore, 2004), we have made an operational approach to this 
phenomena. In that sense, and apart from wider philosophical considerations, for the scope of this paper 
we consider that there exist two different realities; the “objective reality” which represents the exogenous 
information that is captured and transduced through our senses, and the “subjective reality” which is the 
one we finally perceive when the sensory information has been filtered, integrated, modulated, combined, 
modified and feedback through an unnumbered set of emotional, attentional and cognitive processes. 
Thus, we consider that both realities are very different. The first one, we suppose, has a material entity but, 
where does reside the second one? We suppose in our brain. Therefore, we need a system, or a set of 
systems, where subjective reality is finally built, whether it is localized or distributed along several 
networks. Thus, our model does not provide an explanation for what consciousness is or where it resides, 
but it does provide a reasoned explanation for what are the contents that access the conscious level, which 
will be described in depth when introducing the dynamic model, given that some reasoning still need to be 
introduced.  Up to then, consciousness will be considered as an emergent phenomena and a final stage in 
the information processing, which “shows” the results of lower levels of processing (Libet, Gleason, Wright, 
& Pearl, 1983; Libet, 1999, 2004; Haynes & Rees, 2006; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008; Haynes, 2011). 
1.13. Summary 
The fundamental physical laws together with evolutionary and adaptive processes, sustained for long 
periods of time, have shaped the nervous system as a highly optimized mechanism in the processing of 
information, allowing the development of responses that facilitate effective and efficient interaction of 
living beings with its environment, thereby improving their chances of survival and reproduction. 
As part of the optimization mechanism, due to uncertainties about the characteristics and simultaneity of 
stimuli that an individual will face, evolution has selected the emotional system like the responsible for 
carrying out three major functions: 
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1. Deploy broad-spectrum innate responses that allow exploration and rapidly address of novel or 
unexpected stimuli for which there is no a specific response. 
2. Activate cognitive systems, responsible for the search and development of new responses, when 
really needed, thus improving response time and resource consumption. 
3. Indicate the criticality of stimuli to be solved, allowing priority access to the most advanced and 
scarce resources, if concurrency with other processes occurs. 
Thus, and according to our model, the emotional system has control over the activation and dynamics of 
attention, which regulates and prioritizes the access of stimuli information to advanced cognitive systems 
and these, in turn, are able to operate over different functional elements the emotional system utilizes to 
assess the necessity of displaying an emotion. According to this, emotion and cognition do not compete but 
collaborate, mutually complementing to achieve a complete and the most efficient way to resolve the 
challenges the individual has to face. 
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Secction 2: Functional Structure 
2.1. Introduction 
In the first section of this paper we have presented the evolutionary reasoning which allowed us to 
understand the fundamental role that emotions have for optimizing the brain functioning. In this section, 
we present the functional structure that emerges from this reasoning. To do so, we will first introduce 
some basic concepts that will allow us to further address a clearer reasoning. 
2.2. Information sources 
As we have seen, the information that the nervous system processes comes from a variety of sources which 
include: 
- Exogenous or Exteroceptive, in the case of sensory stimuli coming from the interaction with the 
physical world. 
- Endogenous, which can be of two types: 
o Physiological, such us the information received through the sensors located inside the 
body, like those present in the muscles and viscera (proprioceptive & interoceptive). 
o Neural, information that is already represented within different neural systems (e.g. 
memory), or that can be internally generated in the absence of additional sensory 
information (e.g. imagery and thoughts), and which can be cognitively processed and 
reprocessed through different networks to give place to new internal representations 
(Baron, 2012; Kohn, Paulus, & Korde, 2011; Mahon & Caramazza, 2009; Martin, 2007; 
Middleton, Rawson, & Wisniewski, 2011; Patterson et al., 2007). 
2.3. Processes 
Except for a few cases, such as some inborn reflexes and innate responses, that have specific circuits to 
recognize and manage their associated stimuli, the nervous system cannot know a priori what stimuli the 
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individual will face. This, together with the fact that stimuli can range from single nociceptive sensor 
activation up to complex integration of multimodal information, gives our model the form of a process-
oriented structure, where the afferent information is simultaneously processed through different networks 
composed of different specialized systems (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Pessoa, 2013). A double diffusion - 
Integration process (Modha & Singh, 2010; Swanson, 2000) along different brain regions gradually explores 
the saliency of the stimulus together with the context where it is onset  (Fanselow, 2000; Rudy, Huff, & 
Matus-Amat, 2004), both modulated by the expectations previously elaborated, or not (Siegel, Hinson, 
Krank, & McCully, 1982), and generate new or the same responses depending on the input information 
(Edelman & Gally, 2001). 
Our model also includes the need for information processing networks to have the potential to be 
dynamically activated or silenced by other networks, thus allowing the incorporation or selectively blocking 
of information from different pathways, without the need to change the physical connectivity therewith.  
2.4. Levels of processing 
In our model, the data from different sources of information are combined using the diffusion-integration 
process, and are gradually evaluated through a functional hierarchy (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) in which 
we distinguish six main levels (Fig.3.a) that, starting at the lower levels (neuronal level), integrates and 
processes information, transferring the responses generated in each of these levels to different 
destinations, and gradually reaching the top level (relational or associative level).   
At each level, the information is analyzed by different networks (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Martin, 2007; 
Patterson et al., 2007), evaluated and, if necessary, one of the various types of possible responses is 
elicited. Thus, all the information is gradually assessed as it is relayed in a back and forth process, bottom-
up and top-down (Kveraga et al., 2007; Lamme, 2003; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) through the different 
levels of processing to identify those stimuli that are meaningful to the living being. This process is what we 
call Pattern Recognition and is one of the main functions of the nervous system (Scherer, 2009). 
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But this structure is not static. Our model considers this structure of levels as dynamic, especially during 
childhood and adolescence, where brain plasticity mechanisms continually creates and prunes neural 
circuits in order to optimize the critical variables and the operation of the whole system as a set (Chklovskii 
et al., 2004; Low & Cheng, 2006). Thus, new neural pathways allow information at a certain level to be 
feedback to previous levels, like when we imagine or recall, send it in advance (feedforward) to more 
advanced levels in the processing chain, or even in a lateral way, as all have been observed in visual 
information processing (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). This model thus incorporates two main concepts for 
understanding brain structure, recursion and fractal structure of its components. 
2.5. Corollary discharge 
Our model naturally incorporates the mechanism of Corollary Discharge (Fig.3.b) that, at some levels, can 
suppress the information generated by the individual’s own responses. From the efferent copy of the 
response, this system generates a proprioceptive expectation that, appropriately subtracted from re-
afferent signal, allows isolating the actual stimulus information from the response information self-
generated by the individual.  
2.6. Assessment and response 
As we previously saw, this model predicts the existence, at each level, of two parallel networks responsible 
for processing information (Fig. 3-c): 
- A first Emotional system, genetic and that is always present, in charge of processing all stimuli, 
using innate and stereotyped responses (emotions), able to quickly respond to generic and novel or 
unexpected stimuli, in addition to activating cognitive systems and to indicate the criticality of the 
stimulus they represent. 
- A second Expectation-Response system, which can exist since the beginning in the case to be 
genetic (innate response), or may be partially or fully developed (cognitive response / automated), 
or otherwise does not exist at all, as in the case of exposure to a completely novel stimulus (Fig 3.d 
- B). 
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These two networks are interconnected (Evgeniy N. Sokolov, 1963) but, in our model, the emotional system 
is the by default response network, and the expectation-response system is in charge to control the 
Emotional system activation through mechanisms of inhibition (Fig.3-c). This inhibitory mechanism is an 
important subtask of all available responses, whether innate or acquired, and is effective for a limited range 
of stimulus’ values, out of which the inhibition becomes ineffective. We will see in more detail its 
operations in the next section. 
Thus, a certain stimulative pattern can either trigger an emotional response and being "tagged" with an 
emotion (Fig.3-d - A), or produce an "active" response (Fig. 3-d), or both at once if the response is not 
completely effective, is not available, or it doesn’t exist at all (Fig.3-d - B).  
Once a response is found and whether the stimulus is repetitive, the automaticity process allows it to be 
optimized (Fig. 3-d). Through the mechanisms of plasticity, the nervous system adjusts and modifies the 
neural pathways that generate the responses to achieve the best balance between the critical variables 
that define their quality. 
In turn, responses may be constituted by two complementary components (Fig.3-e): 
- A neural component that sends information to other brain systems. 
- A physiological component, which may consist of motor actions and / or endocrine ones. 
In any case, the displayed response can generate a feedback that can be physiological, as postulated by the 
emotion embodiment theories (James, 1884, 1890; Lange, 1885; A. R. Damasio, 1994, 2001; A. Damasio & 
Carvalho, 2013), or neural, activating other networks on the same or on different processing levels. We are 
now working on a new approach for embodiment of emotions (Garcés & Finkel, 2014b, submitted for 
publication). 
2.7. Attention 
As attention topic has been widely introduced in the first section, here we only summarize that previous 
reasoning. Once a stimulus, whose associated response doesn’t exist or it’s not completely effective, has 
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been "tagged" with its corresponding emotion, both enter the Attentional Competition process (Fig.3-f). 
According to this model, the focus and width of the attentional window is thus controlled by the 
characteristics of different emotion-stimulus pairs that, at a given time, act on the attentional model (Fig.3-
f). In our theory, attentional model is a dynamic element that processes emotional information according 
with priority maps codified in both, lateral frontal cortex and parietal cortex (Fecteau & Munoz, 2006). 
Depending on the needs, number, complexity, and criticality of active stimuli at a given time, the 
attentional systems regulates the range and shifts the focus of the attentional windows, allowing 
information concerning to stimuli with higher priority to access the cognitive systems.  
2.8. Cognitive systems 
Cognitive systems (Fig. 3-g) process information following a hierarchical pattern, starting with simpler or 
more probable strategies (according to previous experience) and applying more advanced strategies 
consecutively if the previous one are not able to effectively solve the stimulus that triggered the emotional-
cognitive process. 
2.9. Cognitive responses 
This model gives rise to three different types of cognitive responses the brain can deploy to solve stimuli. 
They are: 
- Responses which act on the stimulus or modify the relationship of the individual with regard to it 
(e.g. fight or flight). 
- Responses acting on the reference model, modifying the expectation the stimulus is compared with 
(e.g. acceptance). 
- Responses acting on functional elements of the system, thus modifying its global dynamics (e.g. 
somatic silencing by anxiolytic consumption). 
It is important to note that we consider stored representations and memory recall as endogenous stimuli 
that must be treated as independent stimuli which can, by themselves, maintain an emotional-cognitive 
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process active even when the original sensory stimulus has already disappeared (e.g remembering a 
beloved). This fact will be of critical importance in describing some extreme psychological phenomena, such 
as Body Dismorphic Dissorder (BDD), as normal responses of a dynamic system exposed to possible, though 
unlikely, context conditions (Garcés & Finkel, 2014b, submitted for publication). Anyway, these three kinds 
of cognitive responses will be developed in more detail when we introduce the dynamic model in the next 
section. 
2.10. Automaticity 
Once a response has been found, and as reasoned in the first section, the brain will try to automatize it as 
much as possible as a way to balance the three critical variables relationships, thus giving place to skills, and 
in some cases also to habits and even addictions. 
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Figure 3. Emotional-Cognitive model. 
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Section 3: Dynamic model 
3.1. Introduction 
In the first two sections we have presented the evolutionary reasoning leading to our model and the 
functional structure that emerges from this reasoning. In this section we analyze the dynamic model, which 
describes the way the various parts of the functional structure interact to generate the sensory, emotional, 
perceptual, cognitive and behavioral phenomena. 
3.2. Pattern recognition  
As we reasoned, the first step to face a significant stimulus is to be able to recognize the characteristics that 
identify it unambiguously. In that sense, once sensory information is captured and encoded, one of the 
most important tasks of the nervous system is to recognize the arising patterns (Scherer, 2009).  
Since the nervous system doesn’t know a priori what stimuli or combinations of them (patterns) are going 
to be significant, it initially needs to run a comprehensive strategy capable of analyzing all the information 
it receives, especially that for which it doesn’t have innate circuits to process and response. Some few 
stimulative patterns are innately represented and can be automatically recognized and processed through 
innate networks such as reflexes or fixed action patterns (e.g. sucking the nipple). From those innate 
patterns, more complex ones are associatively developed in a dynamic learning process, thus giving place 
to capacities like dynamic pattern recognition (e.g. text reading independently of the font it is written in) 
(Mahon & Caramazza, 2009; Martin, 2007; Patterson et al., 2007) .  
It is worth noting that, as significant stimulative patterns can be mono or multimodal, and can arise at 
many different times, forms and sizes, multiple different components can be recruited in parallel networks 
and in back and forth loops to allow recognizing them (Martin, 2007; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). Thus, the 
nervous system gradually integrates, through successive functional levels and recursive bottom-up and top-
down loops (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000), the data from the various sources of multimodal information 
available, both external and internal. In parallel with the creation and optimization of physical network, the 
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vast initial network of neurons and connections will be optimized through the mechanisms of synaptic 
pruning and plasticity (LTP, LTD, iLTP, iLTD, STDP), reinforcing those networks encoding functions necessary 
to recognize and respond to significant patterns the living being is exposed to (Johansen et al., 2014). 
3.3. Corollary discharge 
In addition, the corollary discharge process filters and separates the information concerning the stimulus 
from the self-generated one as a part of the individual’s own response. An example of this system is the 
inability to tickle ourselves, because the brain uses the efferent motor copy to generate a proprioceptive 
sensory expectation (Blakemore et al., 2000). As an example, a malfunction of this system could be behind 
the hallucinations experienced by patients with schizophrenia. In these cases, a failure of this mechanism 
would prevent them from recognizing the voices they hear inside their head as generated by its own brain, 
then interpreting the “inner voice” as if they were induced by an outside agent (Ford & Mathalon, 2004). 
3.4. Emotional and expectation-response systems interaction 
According with our previous reasoning, at birth, few, if any, cognitive representations or responses are 
available, and so the stimuli are responded through very specific or very general innate reflexive networks 
(Viding et al., 2013). While those innate responses are effective, emotional activation is not needed. If 
those responses become ineffective or out of range, emotional information will regulate the innate 
attentional mechanisms indicating the need to intensify the response or to search for another one. Given 
the limited number and range of efficacy of innate responses, as the time goes on and the interaction with 
the environment and sensory experiences accumulate, it is logical to think that the number of episodes 
where innate responses becomes ineffective also grows, thus forcing the activation of the emotional 
system to regulate the development of new cognitive responses. Those new cognitive responses gradually 
give place to the appearance of advanced capacities, mainly cognitive, attentional, more accurate 
expectation generation, and more complex pattern recognition. In that sense, at every developmental 
moment we identify two complementary networks: 
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The first one is the emotional system. This network is always present as it is innate and, by default, 
processes the sensory information in search for emotional-laden patterns. As those significant patterns can 
be either simple or complex, they can arise at every level of information integration and processing. Thus, a 
hierarchical loop should exist to systematically explore multimodal information as it is gradually combined. 
This implies that the emotional response is always the first to be available, though not necessarily 
executed. (Garvert, Friston, Dolan, & Garrido, 2014) _  
The second one is the Expectation-Response system. This network can exist since the beginning if innate, 
can be acquired if cognitive or automated, or might not exist, like in the case of a novel stimulus. If it exists, 
it can be effective in solving the stimulus, or not (e.g. out of range).  
It is important to note that both systems refer to dynamic networks formed by recruiting heterogeneous 
subsystems (Pessoa, 2013). This dual analysis configuration ensures that, if the stimulus is novel and/or if 
the available response is or becomes ineffective, the emotional response is always ready to run, without 
delay, deploying a stereotyped strategy that initially allows to tackle the stimulus while, in parallel, 
prioritizes and regulates the attentional mechanisms to compete for the access to cognitive systems and 
find a more effective response, thus optimizing the overall functioning of the nervous system.  
But, as we expose in the first section, when two parallel networks assume the task of solving the same 
stimuli, it makes no sense that both act at a time. For example, if both simultaneously would run two 
different motor actions using the same muscle groups, their effectiveness would be greatly reduced as both 
responses would mutually interfere (Klein, Petitjean, Olivier, & Duque, 2014; Morsella, Godwin, Jantz, 
Krieger, & Gazzaley, 2015). To avoid it, these two networks should be inversely connected through an 
inhibition mechanism (Fig. 3.c). It stands to reason that this inhibition signal should be generated from the 
network that implements the more specific response to solve the stimulus, the expectation-response 
system, to the network that displays the less specific response, the emotional one. Furthermore, because 
of the importance the emotional responses have for the survival of living organisms, inhibition signal must 
be active, that is, by default the emotional system will not be inhibited. Thus, the inhibiting function of the 
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emotional system will become an important subtask of specific responses, whether innate, cognitive or 
automated.  
The best way to clarify the role of emotions in our theory is to use as an example the "dead-man button". 
This mechanism is used in trains as a safety measure to prevent accidents. The system repeatedly asks the 
driver to actively push a button after a random time interval. Pressing the button inhibits the action of the 
emergency brake, which is active by default. Thus, if the driver suffers a mishap and does not respond to 
the request to press the button, then there is no inhibition of the brake, which is automatically activated, 
stopping the train and avoiding an accident. Importantly, pressing the button maintains active the 
inhibition of the emergency system. 
In our model, the execution of a completely effective response would be equivalent to pressing the "dead-
man button", thus inhibiting the activation of the emotional system, which is active by default after 
stimulus onset. Conversely, if there is no a completely effective response, the inhibition over the emotional 
network will not be complete, executing the emotional response. In this case, emotions are the default 
response that mobilizes physiological and cognitive resources, but only while really needed, thus optimizing 
the functioning of the nervous system (Bassett et al., 2009). This dynamic could give account of the stress 
curve (Fig.4) indicating when the cognitive response is out of range, whether due to cognitive available 
capacity or to the intensity of the stimulus (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908; Diamond, Campbell, Park, Halonen, & 
Zoladz, 2007). 
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Figure 4. Stress curve. 
If we look again for the neuroanatomical and physiological correlates, we found that this mechanism has 
been observed at cellular level in fear-conditioning and extinction experiments. As the conditioned 
response (CR) can return after extinction under different conditions (e.g. spontaneous recovery, renewal, 
reinstatement, external disinhibition), it is thought that conditioned memory survives the extinction 
process, being actively inhibited by new memories (Maren, 2014). In that sense, the CR not only is partially 
depotentiated by the extinction process (LTD), but also actively inhibited in the basolateral nucleus of the 
amygdala (BLA), either potentiating LTP at excitatory synapses among conditioned stimulus (CS) afferents 
that terminate on inhibitory interneurons, or limiting excitatory transmission between the BLA and central 
amygdala (CEA) through synaptic plasticity, induced by afferents coming from the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC) to inhibitory intercalated cells (ITC), thereby suppressing the generation of learned fear 
responses (Maren, 2014; Furini, Myskiw, & Izquierdo, 2014; Hartley & Phelps, 2009; Quirk & Mueller, 
2007). In the same sense, experiments with cognitive inhibition of fear have also shown the active 
inhibition of the amygdala by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) through the same vmPFC region 
thought to mediate the inhibition of fear response during extinction process (Delgado, Nearing, LeDoux, & 
Phelps, 2008; Hartley & Phelps, 2009; Phelps, Delgado, Nearing, & LeDoux, 2004). This mechanism of 
inhibition can also be observed in the startle reflex regulation when subjects are exposed to positive, 
neutral and negative valence stimuli (Speed, 2012).  
Thus, the neural mechanisms implied in extinction and cognitive regulation of fear seems to follow the 
same scheme we propose, where a pathway codifies the parameters of the emotional stimulus and its 
response, while other circuitry, more specific and more effective, actively inhibits that response. 
This model is thus consistent with more experimental models like “dual competition” (Pessoa, 2009), where 
emotional information, whether stimulus-driven or motivational, impairs neurophysiological and behavioral 
responses (Yang et al., 2014). Those experimentally observed interferences are naturally explained within 
our model as “transient states” that exist in the process that leads, from the completely ineffective 
response state (novel stimulus), where a pure emotional response is displayed, to the completely effective 
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response state, where the emotional response is completely inhibited. Therefore, our model explains the 
reason for the gradual changes that affective information processing suffers, as the attentional and 
behavioral components are shifted from innate processing networks to more cognitively acquired and 
automated ones. In that sense, the impact of emotional stimulus on behavioral impairment is not only 
linked to the stimulus’ level of threat (intensity, complexity, etc…), but also to the repeated experience with 
the stimulus (memory) and the degree of efficacy reached in solving it. Therefore, and once again, a 
multifactor function will define the set of resources, innate and acquired, to be recruited into a dynamic 
network to face a specific stimulus.  
We can see this graphically using a simplified diagram (Fig. 5): 
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Figure. 5. Emotional-Cognitive simplified dynamic model. 
This figure shows the scheme to process stimuli. (a) If the stimulus is novel, both for the species and for the individual, 
there will not exist an innate expectation-response network. In that case, the inhibition signal for the emotional 
system will be disabled, which in turn will display an emotion to activate the advanced cognitive systems, thus starting 
the search for a new and more effective response. (b) The emotion stays active throughout the response searching 
process, but is gradually inhibited as the expectation-response set becomes more and more effective. (c) Once an 
effective expectation-response is developed, the more it is automated or the more the predictive systems are fine 
tuned for expectations generation, the more the emotion becomes unnecessary and, therefore, it will be completely 
inhibited. (d) But the emotional network doesn't disappear. It stays inhibited as a contingency element whether the 
response could newly become ineffective. 
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a) According to our model, all stimuli are always simultaneously processed in parallel by two dynamic 
networks, the emotional one and, if it exists, also the expectation-response one. When an organism 
is exposed to a novel stimulus, both for himself and for his species (Fig. 5-a), there is not an innate 
and specific neural circuitry to solve it, nor an expectation to compare with. Thus, the stimulus is 
processed necessarily through the emotional system, displaying an emotion. This emotional 
response, with its physiological and/or neural components, activates and prioritizes the attentional 
access to advanced cognitive systems to search or develop a new response, while in parallel it 
executes a stereotyped behavior, more or less accurate (e.g. fight or flight). 
b) As cognitive systems increasingly develop and refine an effective response to resolve the stimulus 
(Fig. 5-b), predictive systems also generate new increasingly accurate expectations for both, the 
expected change in the characteristics of the stimulus (exaference), and the expected change in the 
system’s proprioceptive state (reaference)(Stahl & Feigenson, 2015). This allows performing the 
appraisal process, which compares the stimulus information as it is modified by the response, and 
the body's proprioceptive state, with the internally developed expectation. This structure allows 
the nervous system to check the effectiveness of their own responses (Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 
2006). 
c) In addition, as a result of the repeated experience and through the automaticity process, the 
efficacy of the response can be gradually improved, thus inhibiting the emotional system to 
optimize brain functioning (Fig. 5-c). 
d) But, what if the response ceases to be effective? In this case the inhibition over the emotional 
network stops again, thus triggering the emotion as the stereotyped and the best available 
contingency response (Fig 5-d). 
This model definitely solves the intense debate that has existed for decades about the concepts and the 
primacy between emotion and cognition (Zajonc, 1980, 1984; Lazarus, 1984, 1991; Leventhal & Scherer, 
1987; C. A. Smith & Lazarus, 1990; Scherer, 2009; Frijda, 2009). In our model there is no place for such a 
discrepancy, since it considers that all these statements are true and complementary, and are the 
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characteristics of the stimulus, its previous history on both, the individual and the species, the context in 
which it occurs and the brain optimization mechanisms which define whether the process performed on 
the sensory information will be emotional, reflexive, cognitive or just an automated expectation-response 
one. 
Also, unlike the theories that consider emotion as an element that provides flexibility allowing isolating 
stimuli from responses (Lazarus, 1991), this theory regards emotions as a system optimizer and contingency 
response mechanism. The flexibility function is thus delegated to cognitive systems (cognition and 
metacognition ) that, as one of the possible solutions they can deploy,  allow to dynamically create and 
delete associations, schemes and representations (Conceptual combination, see Martin, 2007; and 
Patterson et al., 2007 for a review) which are subsequently processed by the emotional network as if they 
were new stimuli, conducting a dual bottom-up and top-down process. 
In the same sense, a similar model was already proposed by Sokolov in the 60s of last century in his work 
about the orienting reflex and the habituation process (Evgeniy N. Sokolov, 1963; Evgeny N. Sokolov et al., 
2002). Our model re-contextualizes that work from a more global systems perspective. Thus, the gradual 
process of finding an effective and increasingly automatic response, or the development of an increasingly 
precise expectation for the stimulus is known as habituation. (Groves & Thompson, 1970; R. F. Thompson, 
2009) 
3.5. Attentional process 
The following stage in the information processing is attentional competition, which is continuously 
assessing the full set of stimulus-emotion pairs that are active at every moment, and actively assigning the 
available resources according to their criticality. Thus, as the active stimuli-emotion pairs dynamically vary 
their criticality, the attentional windows are refocused and expanded or narrowed to reassign the access to 
cognitive systems. 
One of the main problems when exploring the emotional regulation of attention is the fact that diverse 
experiments show a great disparity in their results, some of which seems to show a “hard automaticity” of 
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emotional regulation over attention, others that show “soft automaticity” (depending on the available 
resources) (Pessoa, 2013). Our model gives a framework to explain those different results by taking into 
account the definition of emotion, attention and the automaticity process we have already introduced. 
Thus, a set of different alternatives to attend to a stimulus can be deployed, depending once again on 
novelty, context, response availability, response efficacy, stimuli concurrency, criticality, etc… As an 
example, different attentional processes can be deployed to the same stimulus (e.g. light), from a natural 
stimulus within a limited range (e.g. soft daylight), that is unattended and unconsciously managed through 
a specific reflex circuit (e.g. pupillary reflex), to a completely out of range stimulus (e.g. High beams at 
night) which is emotionally attended to be faced with a spontaneous defensive behavior (e.g. raising the 
hand before the eyes and turning the head) or deploying a cognitively learnt strategy (e.g. deviating gaze to 
the road’s sideline). 
3.6. Dynamic model variables 
At this point, it is worth noting the relationship that arises between the different variables, functions and 
factors when we explore the dynamic model. In that sense, a graphical summary is shown in figure 6. 
Figure 6. Dynamic model variables and relationships 
According to that, the first variable we find is Mismatch which indicates the degree of disagreement 
between stimulus and expectation representations. If the difference surpasses the activation threshold, the 
response, if available, is executed by the expectation-response system. 
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In parallel, we find the variables that characterize the emotional system (arousal and valence). Arousal 
refers to the level of physiological and psychological activation. Valence, in turn, indicates the approach-
avoidance behavioral tendency. If we go on through the emotional system we find Stress, which is the 
primary emotional response, and represents a multidimensional function that combines the arousal and 
valence variables to give place to distress (negative stress) or eustress (positive stress). 
The next step shows the Response Efficacy (or Emotional Inhibition) parameter that, according with our 
reasoning, codifies the degree of inhibition the expectation-response system (if exists) exerts over the 
emotional system, thus regulating its expression according with the level of efficacy achieved. Therefore, 
and as we have previously exposed, we define Emotional Tension as a function that results of applying the 
response efficacy parameter over the stress function. 
Once the emotional tension for a given stimulus is processed, it must be weighted using Criticity maps as a 
reference model towards assigning a Priority to the stimulus representation.   
Finally, through the Attentional Competition process, the brain uses the “relative” priority (dependent of 
current workload) of all concurrent processes, together with the stimuli representations, to dynamically 
manage the shared access to the overlapped cognitive resources.  
3.7. Cognitive responses 
Once a stimulus successfully goes through the attentional competition process, it access cognitive systems 
that will be responsible to find or develop an effective response.  
Before going on exploring cognitive capacities, we should briefly contextualize our work with regard to 
previous definitions of “coping” and classifications of coping strategies identified by other authors (Lazarus, 
1993), in which the term is defined as “efforts to prevent or diminish threat, harm, and loss, or to reduce 
associated distress. Some prefer to limit the concept of coping to voluntary responses; others include 
automatic and involuntary responses within the coping construct” (Carver & Smith, 2010, p. 685).  
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As exposed, our model postulates that an ineffective or inexistent response to face a stimulus does not 
inhibit the elicitation of an emotional-cognitive process in charge to search for an effective response 
capable to minimize its emotional tension. In that sense, and given that in our model emotion always 
regulates cognition, and cognition always pursue minimizing emotion, we consider the term “coping” in a 
wider manner than previous authors, thus including not only the strategies directed to resolve stressful or 
threatening stimuli, but also those positive and rewarding ones. For example, we consider that both, a 
reverie about how to seduce a beloved and a rumination about the possibility of  being fired at work, are 
coping processes, with different characteristics (novelty, intensity, valence, criticality, etc…) looking to 
minimize its own emotional tension through the same functional structure and competing for the same 
cognitive resources. Using a metaphor, they are different input values for the same equation. Thus, we do 
not distinguish them by their focus (problem vs. emotion), volition (engagement vs. disengagement), 
valence (negative vs positive), nor awareness, or even automaticity, given that according with our model 
we can deploy automated though ineffective responses (e.g. compulsive gambling) (see Carver & Smith, 
2010 for a review). See also “habituation and sensitization” below. 
In this sense, and depending on the degree of efficacy, we identified two different groups of responses: 
A. Effective responses: completely resolve the emotional tension associated with the stimulus. 
B. Cyclic responses: the emotional tension is not fully resolved, so that the emotional-cognitive 
process is still active, though it could stay latent if more critical processes take control of 
attentional resources. 
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Figure 7. Cognitive responses. This figure shows some of the different cognitive possibilities the nervous 
system can find to face a stimulus. a) As far as the stimulus matches the expectation, a response is not 
necessary. b) If a mismatch occurs and an effective response is not available, an emotion is disinhibited, 
which in turn regulates the attentional competition to access the cognitive systems. While searching for an 
effective response, but not yet found, those advanced systems can c) positively (optimism) or d) negatively 
(pessimism) shape the expectation (Carver, 2006; Carver & Scheier, 1998), or alternate between both in a 
cyclic process (e.g. motivation and then frustration…). When finally an effective response is found it can e) 
modify the stimulus or the relationship regarding to it f) modify the expectation to match the stimulus or g) 
reframing the stimulus through conceptual combination to create a new interpretation, and therefore a 
new expectation, about it. There are, however, other possibilities (not shown in this figure) that can modify 
the operation of the global system by acting upon different functional elements, thus giving place to 
singular psychological and behavioral phenomena (see text in 3.7 - 3 for details). 
 
Furthermore, as mentioned in Section II, this theory considers three different areas on which cognitive 
responses can act: 
1. Modify the stimulus. 
This kind of responses solves the emotional tension by acting on the sensory information that is 
received. To do that it can follow two different strategies: 
I. Modify the stimulus to match the expectations. In the fight or fly paradigm, the fight 
option would be an example of stimulus modification. This also happens, for example, 
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when we change our physical appearance, for example cutting our hair or wearing makeup 
to get a (subjectively) more enjoyable look.  
II. Modify the individual's relationship with the stimulus. Thus, within this category we can 
include the responses of avoidance (e.g. fly) or approach. An example of this kind of 
responses would be the approaching behavior a small child usually shows toward his 
mother, and the antagonistic behavior of rejection he deploys toward strangers. 
2. Modify the expectations. 
This kind of cognitive responses modifies or create new representations or new relationships 
between previously existing ones, and are usually englobed under “emotion regulation” capacities 
(Gross & Ochsner, 2013; Viviani, 2013) Thus, under this category we can distinguish two different 
strategies: 
I. Modify the expectations to exactly match the stimulus. We call this strategy "Maturity". 
Acceptance would be such a kind of cognitive responses. An example would be the process 
of accepting death as an inevitable and unpredictable fact of life. 
II. Create a new concept or find a new relationship between concepts that expand the 
expectations (Reappraisal), allowing the stimulus fit within this new framework (Mahon & 
Caramazza, 2009; Martin, 2007; Middleton et al., 2011; Patterson et al., 2007). We call this 
process "Growth". An example of this type would be to consider the fact of the inevitability 
and unpredictability of death as elements that make life, today, here and now, something 
valuable and exceptional, worthy of being intensely enjoyed. As discussed below, this 
process of re-contextualization of the same phenomenon is one of the best examples to 
ratify the emotional-cognitive structure proposed by this theory. 
Also, and unlike other models which only consider the possibility to modify the stimulus or the expectation 
(Friston et al., 2006), our model incorporates a third option that follow and let us to explain a lot of 
different observed psychological and behavioral phenomena. 
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3. Modify the system dynamics. 
Such responses can be varied and act directly on any of the functional elements of the model, 
thereby changing the way in which stimulus’ information is processed through the system. Without 
wishing to be exhaustive there are a lot of different strategies: 
I. Modify the activation threshold of a stimulative pattern. This generates a greater or lesser 
activation response to the same stimulus. A simple example would be the priming effect 
where the rapid presentation of a stimulus bias the subsequent response to related or 
unrelated stimulus (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Suslow et al., 2013) 
II. Saturate the available resources. If we look for new and very innovative or intense stimuli 
so that they have greater criticality, they will compete with advantage in the attentional 
competition process and prevent other less priority processes from accessing cognitive 
systems and also consciousness. An example of this strategy would be the compulsive 
activity and intense sensation-seeking behavior that some people show after a painful 
breakup. 
III. Silence the somatic stimuli associated with the emotional response. Thus eliminating the 
phisiological feedback that, together with neural activation, comprises the elements 
defining criticality, thereby minimizing attentional priority again. An example for this 
strategy would be the use or abuse of anxiolytics or chemicals such as alcohol or drugs. 
IV. Generate alternative stimuli. One of the most fascinating strategies postulated by this 
theory is the possibility of internally generating, through mental imagery, alternative 
stimuli that offer a better solution to minimize the overall emotional tension. Thus, these 
imagined stimuli will compete for the same perceptual channel, outperforming the original 
stimulus to provide a better solution. This strategy could be on the foundations of multiple 
perceptual phenomena of reality distortion, and their associated behaviors (e.g. 
deception). One of the most extreme areas where we are currently conducting research is 
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the phenomenon of body image distortion (Body Dismorphic Disorder), which is 
particularly important in conditions such as anorexia nervosa (Garcés & Finkel, 2014a 
submitted for publication). 
V. Time dissociation. Changing the temporal correlation of different related stimuli can 
dissociate them from belonging to the same event, thus reducing again the overall 
emotional tension. 
As exposed before, cognitive responses are developed within a certain range, according to the 
characteristics, intensity and frequency of the stimulus that elicits the search, as well as the emotion 
associated with it. If a new stimulus is beyond the range of effectiveness of a previously developed 
response, the emotional response becomes disinhibited again. A dynamic decision-tree can be found in the 
next figure (Fig. 8) 
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Figure 8. Decision tree for emotional and cognitive responses 
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new response. To manage and create a new concept, cognitive systems must find or create new 
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relationships between previously developed concepts stored in memory. As soon as a new 
concept or metaconcept is created, it is stored and becomes itself a new element that can be 
combined. The greater the number of conceptual elements and their relations:  
- The more flexible, advanced and creative are the new responses. 
- The longer the process to find a new solution. 
- The greater the consumption of resources and energy. 
4. It’s necessary to have different cognitive strategies that can be hierarchically applied to the 
conceptual elements to find those new relationships and associations. 
- The more a cognitive system or strategy is used, the faster and more effective it will 
become. 
- The more advanced, the higher the quality and accuracy of their responses. 
5. To find effective solutions cognitive systems need time. 
- The greater the time available to look for alternatives, the greater the number and 
quality of the options found. 
6. Emotional-cognitive processes are not disabled while they don’t have a totally effective 
response, maintaining emotional tension even outside the attentional focus. Thus, all the 
unsolved stimuli stay latent until attentional competition becomes unloaded, and resources are 
available again. 
3.9. Habituation and sensitization 
But what happens if cognitive systems are not able to find an effective response? 
Given this situation, the only option the brain has to cope with the stimulus is to increase the intensity of 
the best response available at that time, whether emotional or specific (Silvers, Weber, Wager, & Ochsner, 
2014). Thus, in our model, to promote the search for alternatives, the intensity curve of the emotional 
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response associated to a stimulus should follow a growing path (Fig.9b), as a mechanism to increase the 
criticality of the stimulus and gradually giving it a greater priority in the process of attentional competition. 
As a result of this process the phenomenon of sensitization can arise (Groves & Thompson, 1970), which 
intensifies the emotional response, and so the perception, and may even completely take control before a 
low intensity stimulus, a phenomenon also known as "emotional hijacking". 
Thus, our model integrates the principles reasoned by Groves and Thompsom (1970), considering the 
variable S as the activation of the emotional network, and the variable H as the efficacy of the expectation-
response network, and both are related through the mechanism of inhibition postulated by Sokolov 
(Evgeniy N. Sokolov, 1963).  
Habituation does not occur if the response is not completely effective. The unresolved stimulus may see 
how its criticality becomes gradually reduced, so it doesn’t get access to cognitive resources, being 
relegated but not disabled. 
 
Figura 9. (a) The intensity of emotional response is regulated by emotional tension, and this in turn by the 
efficacy of the response available. (b) When cognitive systems are not able to find a completely effective 
response, the only option is to increase the intensity of both, the emotional response to give greater 
priority to its associated stimuli in the process of attentional competition, and the best response available 
to address the stimulus. 
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3.10. Learning, automaticity and control 
When a new cognitive response is developed, it is stored by the new relationships between concepts and 
the activation timing thereof or Short Time Potentiation (STP). Thus, the learning process together with the 
automaticity process will consolidate the new relationship as the stimulus occurs repeatedly. But the brain 
always took advantage of previous work. From an evolutionary standpoint, the efficacy principle tells us 
that there must always be at least one basic response to address or explore any stimulus. That means that, 
even when you find a new response for a stimulus, the older should be preserved. Thus, new pathways 
would be a kind of "short-circuit" that bypass the old response above for the benefit of the new one. While 
effective, the new responses are executed but, if they fail, the brain gives way to the old one, less effective, 
while the emotional process associated reactivate the search for a new and more effective cognitive 
response. This approach gives account of the irrationality of many behaviors that arise when people are 
exposed to stimuli that exceed the range of application of already developed cognitive responses.  
Thus, and according to the theory and functional model exposed, the control systems are themselves 
cognitive responses that naturally emerge as a result of creating, through learning processes, new 
relationships between cognitive responses and stimuli patterns that elicited its development.  
As it happen with other cognitive responses, some control responses could also be automated, thus 
optimizing their execution. This has important implications for trying to understand and explain the 
evolution and development of behaviors, whether individual or social. 
3.11. Emotion-cognition systemic dynamics 
This point is one of the fundamental keys of this theory, and has important implications that must be 
explored to understand psychological phenomena, behavior and decision-making process. 
So far, we have focused on the dynamics of a single emotional - cognitive process that tries to minimize its 
own emotional tension. But we cannot forget that all emotional - cognitive processes work on a common 
space we call conceptual space, i.e. all use information stored in different memory systems to create 
cognitive alternatives that allows them to effectively solve their own emotional tension. This means that 
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different processes can modify the existing conceptual relationships and create new ones within that 
shared conceptual space. These changes may in turn cause that other processes, whose emotional tension 
was inactive, to be activated or reactivated as a result of dynamically modifying the already existing 
associations. This will cause these processes, previously inactive, begin again their own emotional - 
cognitive cycle to find a new response that enables them to return to its minimum tension state. 
At this point we must consider two things: 
- According to our model, the most primary and basic a concept is, the greater the number of meta- 
concepts and relationships built over it (Qin et al., 2014). Thus, we can assume that the 
modification of a very primary concept triggers the reactivation of more processes dependent on it, 
which in turn will generate a greater overall emotional tension in the system. 
- On the other hand, we must not forget that emotional - cognitive processes do not stop until there 
is a fully effective response to face the stimuli that elicited them. 
Considering this, the theory predicts that the brain will try to find the most balanced response possible for 
the system as a whole, i.e. the one that minimizes the overall emotional tension of all processes 
concerned. That means that, in the process of assessing different options to face the same stimulus, the 
brain decides between them in terms of overall emotional tension associated with each possible response, 
including all partial tensions generated along the thinking chain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981, 1992). 
So, if we take the sensations, perceptions, concepts, meta - concepts and their associations, and consider 
the different emotional-cognitive processes that act on them as "agents" competing to minimize their own 
emotional tension, we can postulate that the brain process of decision-making takes the form of what in 
game theory is known as a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950, 1951). This means that, once found a response, 
none of the processes involved can unilaterally reduce its emotional tension by changing its own response. 
By adding this new systemic level, oscillatory phenomena such as sensation seeking, altruism or self-
harmful behaviors can be explained, laying the foundations for a new paradigm in the study of motivation, 
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decision making and behavior, whether in individuals as in social groups (Myers, 2012). These 
consequences of the theory may have important implications which we are now investigating in 
collaboration with the Interdisciplinary Group of Complex Systems GISC, in the Carlos III University of 
Madrid, and the Political sciences & Socilogy Faculty in the Complutense University of Madrid. 
3.12. Theory implications 
This theory and its associated model let us open important hypothesis, which should be explored in more 
depth in the future, for understanding and scientifically explaining many psychological and behavioral 
phenomena, including the following: 
- Allows us to have a functional model which, through its own dynamics and without resorting to 
malfunction assumptions, can cause the individual deploy behaviors contrary to their own 
biological fitness (Garcés & Finkel, 2014b). 
- Generates plausible hypothesis to explain the contents that access consciousness, helping to 
explain the mechanisms that underlie perception and the construction of subjective reality. In this 
sense, the theory generates a model to explain phenomena such as Body Dysmorphic Disorder that 
occurs in diseases such as anorexia nervosa (Garcés & Finkel, 2014a). 
- Let’s to scientifically redefine, in a solid and well-founded way, psychological concepts far 
unbounded like the construction of self-concept and mainly self-esteem (Garcés & Finkel, 2014c), 
fundamental topic given its influence in the psychological development of individuals, in education 
and social relationships. 
- Allows addressing, from a systems perspective, the study of phenomena such as habits, 
ruminations and addictions, especially those in which there is not involved the use of external 
chemicals (e.g. gambling addiction). 
- It provides a solid framework that can be taken into the field of simulation, in which to fit the 
phenomena studied in neuroeconomics and neuromarketing such as decision making and the 
emotional impact on them. 
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- Provides a new approach to address phenomena such as violence from a cognitive point of view, 
being able to frame the emotional intensity within a structure that can be described and justified to 
the aggressive subject as part of a cognitive therapy. 
- Provides a framework in which to study the evolution of emotional processes with important 
implications for the understanding of so important psychological phenomena such us motivation, 
learning, creativity and innovation. 
- It lays the foundations to extend the theory to its social dimension. 
- Gives some well-founded clues to better understand the development of cognition and the 
relevance of the emotional stimulation for a correct improvement of education programs. 
- Provides a model for understanding the development of cognitive and control systems based on 
emotional arousal to which the person is exposed. 
 
3.13. Conclussions 
Along this paper we have followed a logical reasoning to support our hypothesis that emotions are an 
innate resource for nervous system optimization. As such, and by default, they are in charge to manage all 
the stimuli for which there is not an effective response available, whether innate, cognitive or automated, 
also regulating the activation of cognitive mechanisms and prioritizing the access to them to find a new and 
more effective response. In turn, effective responses actively inhibits the expression of emotions, as they 
are not necessary, thus self-regulating the functioning of the system. Once responses are found, 
architectural strategies (e.g. memory, pattern recognition, expectations, etc…) together with automaticity 
also optimizes their execution. As the number of simultaneous stimuli, both exogenous and endogenous, 
can become numerous, and given that all of them work over the same “conceptual space”, they can 
mutually influence, forcing the brain to find the best option among available responses to minimize the 
overall emotional tension. All this mechanisms makes the nervous system to be able to deploy a wide set of 
different solutions, most of which are adaptive, while others are not, thus giving place to some more or less 
extreme biased psychological and behavioral phenomena (eg. Body Dysmorphic Disorders) 
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